



Most of those trying to assess what Keir Starmer stands for and how he plans to achieve his objec-
tives are too impressed by an understanding of Thatcherism associated with Stuart Hall. That is
one reason why they complain that Starmerism is little more than an empty space. But other less
heroic ways of thinking about a leader’s ‘ism’ are available and using a more multidimensional
approach, this article assesses the evolution of Starmerism through his successful campaign to be
leader of a divided party and his first year as leader of the opposition. On that basis it suggests
that Starmerism as currently articulated is close to a ‘Corbynism with the brakes on’, although
if it is to resonate with the public, Starmer himself needs to adopt some of the rhetorical tools
associated with Wilsonism at its peak.
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POLITICAL ANALYSISTS almost take it for
granted that every party leader should have
the suffix ‘ism’ attached to their name.
Certainly, those hoping to discover Keir Star-
mer’s ultimate purpose and the core ideas
that underpin how he proposes to chart
Labour’s path back to power, are currently
searching, most with some frustration, for a
‘Starmerism’.
An increasing media focus on leaders as the
defining protagonists of electoral competition
has undoubtedly contributed to the perceived
significance of the personalised ‘ism’. In
response, parties now project themselves
through their leader’s often-contrived persona
to convey to mostly politically disengaged cit-
izenswhat they are about in the kind of human
terms they might appreciate. This has some-
times led observers to assign an unwarranted
significance to personal traits and imbue hope-
ful words with bogus importance. But most
leaders, including those few who become
Prime Minister, usually possess a highly con-
strained agency. What price an ‘ism’ then?
Certainly, that was Richard Rose’s view of
Margaret Thatcher when in 1980 he predicted
the new PrimeMinister would remain trapped
within the postwar policy consensus.1
As we now know, Rose was wrong. While
still just leader of the opposition, Thatcher’s
hegemonic intention to overthrow collectiv-
ism and transform popular political thinking
had been identified by Stuart Hall.2 Few
doubted that after a decade in office
Thatcher had decisively acted on those
intentions: according to the Daily Mail,
reflecting on her death in 2013, Thatcher
was, ‘The woman who saved Britain’. Seem-
ingly, if any leader merited an ‘ism’ it was
her. But despite being such an exceptional
figure—regularly ranked as one of the coun-
try’s best Prime Ministers—Hall’s heroic
conception of an ideologically coherent and
fantastically determined Thatcherism has
become the model against which subsequent
‘isms’ have been measured. That is certainly
true of those looking for Starmerism; and
given this template they have inevitably
been disappointed, mostly finding an ‘ism’
defined by vacuity. Tom Kibasi’s assessment
can stand for many, one he made close to
Starmer’s first year as leader. A supporter
of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership who had
nonetheless backed Starmer’s campaign to
replace him, Kibasi declared: ‘If Starmer
were to depart asleader tomorrow, he would
1R. Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference?, Chatham NJ,
Chatham House, 1980.
2S. Hall, ‘The great moving right show’, Marxism
Today, vol. 23, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 14–20.
The Political Quarterly
© 2021 The Author. The Political Quarterly published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC).
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1
not leave a trace of a meaningful political
project in his wake’.3
And yet, according to a less regarded perspec-
tive, even Thatcherism might have failed the
Kibasi test. For according to Peter Kerr, hers
‘was a complex and often contradictory project
which defied easy definition. At times it was
visionary and radical, whilst at others it was
ad-hoc, short-termist and quite incoherent. It
was everybit as pragmatic as itwas ideological’.4
This is a very different take to the one pro-
pounded by Hall, one which places the Conser-
vative leader’s agency closer to that of normal
humans. Certainly, Ivor Crewe considered that
Thatcher’s undoubted reshaping of Britain’s eco-
nomic and social order lay in more structural
sources, such as the electoral system (and, one
might add, a divided Labour Party) over which
she had little control, butwhich allowed theCon-
servatives to stay in office for so long. And,
despite her hegemonic ambitions—the ones
emphasised by Hall and his emulators—Crewe
claimed Thatcher had failed to engineer her
hoped-for revolution in popular attitudes.5
This latter multidimensional take on the
forces that can shape a leader’s ‘ism’was in fact
anticipated well before Thatcher won her first
general election, for she was not the first politi-
cian to have an ‘ism’ attached to their name. In
1964 Harold Wilson—coincidentally Starmer’s
favourite Labour leader—inspired the young
Perry Anderson to delineate the character of
Wilsonism. Rather than seeing Wilson as a sin-
gular figure imbued with heroic agency,
Anderson’s assessment lent heavily on contin-
gency, context and structure.6 On the one hand,
he wrote, Wilson had made Labour into ‘the
dynamic left-wing of European Social-Democ-
racy’. Through his ‘white heat’ rhetoric he gave
his party a new sense of purpose by redefining
the role of the state to suit the needs of modern
Britain. But Anderson also believed Wilsonism
bore, ‘the ominous hallmarks of its lineage, tra-
ditional Labourism’, for Wilson attacked not
capitalism as such, but only inefficient capital-
ism. However, writing just before Labour won
the 1964 general election, Anderson saw Wil-
sonism as an open-ended phenomenon. It
was, for a Labour left seeking a more socialist
programme, ‘neither a barrier nor a tramplin
… it is simply a political space in which it can
work. … Anything can be read into it’.
Starmer has been Labour leader for over a
year. In outlining the ideas and actions that
define his leadership thus far, it is important
to keep inmind that, like those ‘isms’ that have
come before it, will likely be (i) an over-
determined ideological compound refracted
through (ii) the practicalities of the party con-
text, bent into shape by (iii) the imperative to
win power, and ultimately articulated through
(iv) an idiosyncratic persona. All these ele-
ments exist together, each working on the
other, but which is the most significant will
likely depend on (v) the character of the times,
or what might be more grandly called the his-
torical conjuncture. That at least is the basis
for this analysis—one which makes more than
a nod toMaurice Cowling’s concept of the ‘the
politics of continuous tension’—of what con-
vention dictates we must call Starmerism.7
A divided party
Starmer never pretended to be a Corbynite.
But, in 1988 as a 25-year-old he helped orga-
nise Tony Benn’s ill-fated campaign to unseat
Neil Kinnock as Labour leader, something
which then placed him on the hardest shores
of the Labour left. A lot happened to Starmer
in the intervening decades and in 2015 as a
newly elected MP, he supported not Benn’s
presumptive heir, but Andy Burnham in that
year’s leadership election.8 Even so, Starmer
joined Corbyn’s front bench as a junior Home
3T.Kibasi, ‘Keir Starmer’s leadership needs anurgent
course correction’, The Guardian, 16 February 2021;
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2021/feb/16/keir-starmer-leadership-urgent-course-
correction-labour (accessed 23 February 2021).
4P. Kerr, ‘Thatcherism: A phrase coined here in Bir-
mingham’, Perspectives, n.d.; https://www.
birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/thatcher-
peter-kerr-2.aspx (accessed 7 December 2020).
5I. Crewe, ‘Values: the crusade that failed’, in
D. Kavanagh andA. Seldon, eds., The Thatcher Effect.
A Decade of Change, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1989.
6P. Anderson, ‘Critique of Wilsonism’, New Left
Review, no. 27, 1964, pp. 3–27.
7Outlined in S. Fielding, ‘High politics’, in
D. Brown, G. Pentland and R. Crowcroft, eds., The
Oxford Handbook of Modern British Political History,
1800–2000, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018.
8G. Hinsliff, ‘Keir Starmer: who is he, really?’, Tor-
toise, 23 March 2021; https://www.tortoisemedia.
com/2021/03/23/234053/ (accessed 9 April 2021).
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Office minister although he resigned as part of
the 2016 attempt to unseat him as leader. After
Corbyn’s re-election, Starmer re-joined the
Shadow Cabinet to hold the critical job of
Shadow Brexit Secretary. In that post he had
a number of disagreements with Corbyn,
mostly owing to Starmer’s support for a more
Remain-friendly Brexit position. This led him
to being frozen out of the party’s 2019 national
campaign.
Despite this fractious history, when seeking
the votes of Labour members as a candidate
for the leadership, Starmer held back from cri-
ticising Corbyn. In fact, he praised him for
making Labour an ‘anti-austerity’ party. Star-
mer even underlined his own radicalism by
issuing a video which emphasised the legal
help he gave striking miners and poll tax pro-
testers; it also reminded viewers of his opposi-
tion to the Iraq war. Later in the campaign
Starmer issued ten carefully worded personal
pledges which seemed to suggest that as
leader he would consolidate Corbyn’s plat-
form. He did all this because, while enjoying
the support of most of Corbyn’s opponents,
Starmer still needed the votes of a significant
proportion of those who still supported Cor-
byn’s policies. In July 2019, after Labour had
suffered unprecedented reverses in European
parliamentary and local government elections,
YouGov found that 82 per cent of members
thought Corbyn still had the right policies for
Britain. At the same time, 68 per cent consid-
ered Starmer the best person to succeed him,
a groundswell largely based on his advocacy
of a second Brexit referendum: while 74 per
cent of Remain-inclined members wanted
him to succeed Corbyn, that was true of only
44 per cent of Leave supporters.
Starmer could therefore not have become
leader without Corbynite votes: in January
2020 YouGov discovered that one third of
those proposing to vote for him awarded Cor-
byn at least 7/10 as leader.9 As Paul Mason—
one of a number of ex-Corbyn backers who
now endorsed Starmer—had it, many mem-
bers were looking for a figure who supported
Labour’s 2019 manifesto but also possessed
‘professionalism, prudential principle, resil-
ience, communicative ability, and the ability
to focus a team around a task’.10 Yet, as You-
Gov also found, in February 2020, while one
third of Starmer supporters wanted, in effect,
the ‘competent Corbynism’ Mason outlined,
and so for Labour to keep going in the direc-
tion mapped out since 2015, two thirds
believed a change of course was required.
Starmer’s success in bridging this divide
meant his election was never in doubt. He won
56.2 per cent of votes, nearly double that of his
nearest rival, the supposed ‘continuity Corbyn’
candidate Rebecca Long-Bailey. But this victory
was based on a refusal to address a fundamental
conflict within his own supporters. Instead, Star-
mer pointed both ways at once, appearing to do
the impossible in Labour terms, by beingpositive
about Corbyn and Tony Blair, coining themuch-
repeated mantra: ‘Don’t trash the last Labour
government and don’t trash the last four years.’
Thiswas ahighlydeveloped formof constructive
ambiguity, onewhich allowedmembers to see in
Starmer whatever they wanted, something rein-
forced by his refusal to say if he was politically
closer to Blair or Corbyn. But it intentionally
emphasised another of Starmer’s campaign
themes: that he would end the factionalism that
had characterised the Corbyn years.
Some looked on Starmer’s campaign cyni-
cally. Just like Wilson, John Rentoul claimed,
Starmer, ‘is coming to the leadership by pre-
tending to be more left-wing than he is’; under
the cover of ‘unity’ Rentoul predicted he
would nudge members in his desired direc-
tion.11 Some of Starmer’s Corbynite opponents
even accused him of being a Blairite Trojan
horse. Such left critics could point to the fact
that Starmer enjoyed the enthusiastic support
of Labour First and Progress, factions which
had been Corbyn’s most implacable oppo-
nents. They certainly saw in Starmer a chance
to end the Corbyn experiment and cooperated






10Quoted in G. Pogrund and P. Maguire, Left Out.
The Inside Story of Labour Under Corbyn, London,
Bodley Head, 2020, p. 347.
11J. Rentoul, ‘Pipe dream: Keir Starmer, the newHar-
old Wilson of the Labour Party’, The Independent,
19 March 2020; https://www.independent.co.uk/
independentpremium/long-reads/starmer-wilson-
labour-leader-history-corbyn-blair-attlee-a9403401.
html?r=545 (accessed 29 November 2020).
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under the banner of Labour Together with
some of their leading figures assuming critical
roles in his campaign. There was, however, an
ambiguity about Starmer’s ultimate direction
even here: his team also included some who
had previously worked for the departing
leader.
On becoming leader, Starmer nonetheless
remained true to his pledge to end factional-
ism. He removed some of Corbyn’s most parti-
san supporters from his front bench but
retained others, notably Long-Bailey, and pro-
moted less prominent members of the Socialist
Campaign Group, like Sam Tarry, to junior
positions. There was, however, a shift towards
MPs who, like Starmer, could not be described
as Corbynites or Blairites, most prominently
Ed Miliband. In the following months, how-
ever, a number of Corbynites resigned or in
the case of Long-Bailey were sacked from the
front bench: Corbynwas even suspended from
the parliamentary Labour Party.
Some on the left saw this as evidence of
Starmer’s disingenuousness: despite his rhe-
toric he was no unifier, but a factionalist of
the right. It might, however, be more accu-
rately seen as a result of Starmer’s determina-
tion to ensure the party abided by the legally
enforceable stipulations of the Equalities and
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) investi-
gation into Labour’s anti-semitism, which
reported in October 2020. Long-Bailey was
only sacked after she refused to delete her
retweet of a tweet Starmer’s office claimed
contained an anti-semitic conspiracy theory;
Corbyn was suspended only because he
refused to withdraw remarks which
appeared to question the basis for the
EHRC’s damning report. Given how
staunchly Starmer staked his initial reputa-
tion on ridding Labour of anti-semitism and
rebuilding relations with the Jewish commu-
nity, it is hard to see how else he could have
responded and remained credible. These
exits and suspensions, which now include
numerous constituency party members
angry at Corbyn’s fate, betrays a genuine
belief on the part of some that accusations of
anti-semitism were used to undermine the
late leader. But it is also part of the far left’s
implacable resistance to anything they see
as a retreat from the 2019 manifesto, which
for them has now attained almost biblical sig-
nificance. Instead of seeing possibilities in the
new leader, the far left has been determined
to turn him into their enemy. This strategy
has seen Corbynites lose ground in the wider
party, one illustrated by the marginalisation
of Momentum. And while measured in terms
of National Executive Committee contests,
the far left retains some significant support
amongst members, this has not prevented
Starmer securing a majority on the party’s
governing body and appointing his own
choice as General Secretary.
Mountain ranges to climb
Starmer won the leadership in April 2020
through a disciplined constructive ambiguity
that allowed him to win support across a
divided party. From this point he faced the
more challenging task of trying to become
Prime Minister at the next election, which
meant winning over a much bigger and very
different kind of electorate, but one also at
odds with itself. Ambiguity remained his
favoured tool, but in the pursuit of votes, Star-
mer was also forced to make early choices.
These revealed an ultimate purpose that did
not quite tallywith how he had presented him-
self to Labour members while seeking to be
their leader, although it hardly revealed him
to be a Blairite Trojan horse.
Starmer became leader after Labour’s
fourth defeat in a row, an unhappy series for
which there was no single explanation. In
2010 the party lost in the midst of an interna-
tional financial crisis, the domestic impact of
which many voters blamed on the spending
of the New Labour governments. It marked
the end of Labour’s thirteen years in office
and its leadership’s keen embrace of the free
market. But Ed Miliband’s cautious attempt
to nudge the party back towards collectivism
floundered in 2015 as voters stuck with David
Cameron’s austerity. Many in the party
believed this defeat marked the end of Labour
as a moderate centre left and essentially par-
liamentary force, and that it was time to
embrace the grass roots radicalism of the
new social movements. The 2017 election
saw Labour significantly improve its vote
share, but how far that was thanks to Cor-
byn’s leadership or Theresa May’s disastrous
campaign remains moot. And, in any case,
Labour still lost. Moreover, two years later,
whatever gains Corbyn made were wiped
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away thanks to his obscure Brexit policy,
along with voters’ accumulated doubts about
him and their belief that Boris Johnson was a
different kind of Conservative. The 2019 elec-
tion saw Labour’s tally of Commons seats fall
to its lowest since 1935 and its vote share
reduced to 32.1 per cent, 11.5 per cent behind
the Conservatives. If Labour is to win a Com-
mons majority at the next election, it not only
has a mountain to climb, it has to traverse a
whole series of mountain ranges.
When campaigning for the leadership, Star-
mer fought shy of outlining in any detail his
own diagnosis of Labour’s 2019 defeat. When
pushed to say why Labour had lost so badly,
his response was carefully calibrated, saying,
‘Partly that was to do with the leadership,
rightly or wrongly, partly it was to do with
Brexit, anti-Semitism came up, and the over-
load of the manifesto.’12 Few in the party
could have disagreed with that—although
some Corbynites undoubtedly bridled at his
reference to anti-semitism. Starmer did, how-
ever, make the important, if obvious point,
that Labour’s troubles went deeper than its
last campaign. Johnson’s capture of many
red wall seats—postindustrial and largely
poor manual working class constituencies,
mostly situated in the EnglishNorth andMid-
lands and traditionally associatedwith strong
Labour support—had been a long time com-
ing. Voters in such seats, especially those
who were white, mature, male and with a
basic education, favoured an interventionist
economic role for government—one not
offered during the New Labour period in
office—but were also culturally conservative.
The latter characteristic had become increas-
ingly important thanks to Brexit, which they
strongly supported. If this group had been
moving away from Labour since before
2010, the combination of their support for
Leave, dislike of Corbyn’s radical internation-
alism and Johnson’s promise of ‘levelling up’
contributed to Labour finally losing a worry-
ing number of seats, and without which it
could wave goodbye to any chance of ever
regaining office.
The patriotic turn
For understandable reasons, therefore, Star-
mer made rebuilding ‘trust’ with this lost
group one of his first main priorities as leader,
something confirmed by his appointment of
Claire Ainsley as his Director of Policy. It was
largely for their benefit that Starmer asserted
Labour had changed thanks to his ‘new lead-
ership’, and for their ears that in his first
leader’s conference speech he stressed ‘family’
as ‘a fundamental value’.13 In this key address
Starmer principally highlighted ‘patriotism’,
given that ‘The reason we [in the Labour
Party] go out knocking on doors is because
we believe in the country. We’ve been a bit
shy of that in recent years. We’ve not said
it. A movement that wants this to be the best
country it can possibly be. It is a very patriotic
left-wing tradition’. Starmer also said he
wanted to make Britain a country defined by
‘Security for our nation, our families and for
all of our communities’. At about this time
his team commissioned a strategy document
which built on these relatively conservative
tropes. It recommended the party’s ‘use of
the flag, veterans, dressing smartly at the war
memorial etc’ to show those now—signifi-
cantly—referred to as living in ‘foundation
seats’ that Labour was aligned with their
own cultural values.14
Starmer’s patriotic turn was designed to
address the damage done by the widespread
perception that Corbyn had held other kinds
of loyalties, misgivings which came to a head
when he appeared to side with Putin’s Russia
over the Salisbury poisonings. There was a
sense across the party that this had to be recti-
fied, and quickly. In January 2020 YouGov dis-
covered that 50 per cent of Labour members
believed it important their next leader be
‘patriotic’, which made it the second most
sought-for quality after enjoying the support
of the trade unions. At the same time YouGov
12‘Labour leadership: don’t just blame 2019 cam-
paign, Starmer warns’, BBC News, 16 January
2020; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
51139619 (accessed 27 February 2021).
13‘Full text of Keir Starmer’s speech at Labour Con-
nected’, Labour Party, 22 September 2020; https://
labour.org.uk/press/full-text-of-keir-starmers-speech-
at-labour-connected/ (accessed 5 November 2020).
14A. Chakrabortty and J. Elgot, ‘Leak reveals Labour
plan to focus on flag and patriotism to win back
voters’, The Guardian, 3 February 2021; https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/
03/labour-red-wall-voters-patriotism-keir-starmer
(accessed 28 February 2021).
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discovered that 55 per cent of members
believed it possible to have a ‘progressive
patriotism’—although 25 per cent did not.
Long-Bailey had coined this term when cam-
paigning to be leader in order to show she
recognised Labour’s problem with red wall
voters. She linked Britain’s ‘long history of
patriotism rooted in working life, built on
unity and pride in the common interests and
shared life of everyone’ to a generous interna-
tionalism.15 Even so, some Corbynites criti-
cised her very reference to patriotism,
progressive or otherwise: Starmer’s promotion
of it—without any obvious qualification—as a
central value made some others very uncom-
fortable. For the MP Clive Lewis, his leader’s
apparently uncritical embrace of an open-
ended patriotism meant Starmer was verging
on appeasing racism, something Labour
leaders have done in the past.16 The issue
was, for a significant minority of members,
those who had welcomed Corbyn’s 2019
pledge to make teaching the unjust nature of
the British Empire part of the national curricu-
lum, an existential one.
This controversy raised wider questions
about how a Starmerism defined in terms of
family and patriotism, so as to attract voters
in ‘foundation seats’, might alienate its exist-
ing metropolitan middle class and ethnic
minority supporters for whom such a framing
might be problematic. For if it wanted to win a
Commons majority, demographic change
means Labour has to appeal to both groups,
described by Maria Sobolewska and Robert
Ford as ‘identity conservatives’ and ‘identity
liberals’.17 This task had proved beyond both
the Miliband and Corbyn leaderships. In con-
trast, as the beneficiary of this new electoral
cleavage, one accentuated by Brexit, the Con-
servatives gleefully promoted a ‘culture war’
hoping to keep Britons pitted against each
other.
Starmer’s aim was not unlike that of his two
immediate predecessors. His approach also
echoed recommendations contained in the
cross-party Labour Together report into how
the party might transcend the divide. Starmer,
therefore, sought to ‘decontest’ this cultural
conflict and turn conservative and liberal iden-
tifiers towards material issues that, thanks to
austerity and now Covid, might unite them.
That meant, amongst other things, promising
significantly better public services and policies
designed to reduce inequality, in other words
more traditional Labour ground. Starmer’s
culture war pacifism was exemplified during
the 2020 Black Lives Matters protests when a
crowd tore down the statue of Bristol slave
trader Edward Colston, something which
became a matter of national debate. The
Labour leader coolly condemned the crowd’s
actions but suggested the statue should
already have been disposed of, albeit in a con-
sensual manner. This not only prevented the
Labour leader being dragged into a divisive
issue; it was also a view shared by most
Britons.
More substantively, Starmer sought to neu-
tralise the deeply divisive Brexit issue in
December 2020 by ordering his MPs to vote
for the Johnson government’s deeply flawed
deal with the EU and, some claim, to subse-
quently discourage them from criticising its
damaging consequences. Starmer had been a
leading advocate of a second referendum and
owed his leadership to that position. Yet, if
his turnabout disturbed Labour’s overwhelm-
ingly Remain MPs and members, it nonethe-
less stymied Conservative attacks on the
party. How much damage this has done to
Labour’s existing support amongst once
strongly Remain liberal identifiers is not yet
known, although a Talk/together survey sug-
gests affiliations based on Leave and Remain
are on the wane now Johnson has finally ‘Got
Brexit Done’.18 Even so, some fear Starmer’s
approach to Brexit, as well as the family and
patriotism, took identity liberals for granted
15R. Long-Bailey, ‘We can take the Labour party
back into power. Here’s how’, The Guardian,
29 December 2019; https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2019/dec/29/rebecca-long-
bailey-labour-party-britain (accessed 28 February
2021).
16Chakrabortty and Elgot, ‘Leak reveals
Labour plan’.
17M. Sobolewska and R. Ford, Brexitland: Identity,
Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2020.
18Talk/together project, Our Chance to Reconnect,
Final Report, executive summary, March 2021;
https://together.org.uk/Executive-Summary.Talk
Together.pdf (accessed 9 March 2021).
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and that they might turn to parties more
keenly attuned to their cultural preferences.
Corbynism with the brakes on
Starmer’s initial focus on changing percep-
tions of the party amongst those whose votes
Labour most urgently needs to win back has
been meat and drink to left critics like Owen
Jones who claim Starmerism ‘lacks a political
soul’.19 Jones—like most commentators across
the political spectrum—holds to the heroic
view of Thatcherism and, as did many Labour
members, praised Corbyn for emulating the
late Conservative leader’s hegemonic ambi-
tion, even though it led to two election defeats.
Within such an imaginary, Starmerism can
only look pathetic. For it overlooks the party
context Starmer had to negotiate simply to
become leader, and underestimates the dire
electoral inheritance bequeathed to him by
previous leaderships. Both structural realities
have inevitably shaped Starmerism, as they
would any ‘ism’. But that does not mean it is,
as the likes of Jones claim, simply a function
of focus groups. For those with eyes to see,
Starmerism is in fact characterised by a defi-
nite ideological purpose, one the Labour
leader has consistently, if insufficiently, used
to try to shape popular perceptions of the
Covid crisis and to justify Labour’s response
to its appalling economic impact.
The international pandemic would have cre-
ated difficulties for any new leader of the
opposition given that the usual inclination of
voters in a crisis is to rally round the govern-
ment. Like Clement Attlee before Labour
entered the wartime coalition in 1940, Starmer
acted as a parliamentary gadfly, supporting
Johnson’s aim of containing the virus, while
highlighting areas where the government’s
response was lacking. This allowed Starmer
to display his ability to grasp complex detail,
a quality the Prime Minister sadly lacked,
and so expose the government’s often lacka-
daisical reaction to the crisis. Voters appeared
to notice Starmer’s superior grip and he soon
bested Johnson in YouGov’s Best PrimeMinis-
ter surveys.
If Covid allowed Starmer to demonstrate his
personal qualities, he also argued that Labour
had the right approach to deal with its conse-
quences and to ensure that Britain was better
able to deal with any similar future crises. In
his very first statement as leader, Starmer
imposed his own meaning on the crisis, to
invest it with a significance derived from a
view of society very different to that of the
Conservatives, and consistentwith established
Labour concerns. The Covid crisis, he said,
meant, ‘we cannot go back to business as
usual. This virus has exposed the fragility of
our society. It’s lifted a curtain’ and made the
case for ‘good government, a government that
saves lives and protects our country’.
That Covid had transformed the basis for
politics has been a consistent theme during
Starmer’s first year as leader, although it has
usually taken a backseat to demonstrations of
his competence at Prime Minister’s questions.
However, in a major speech delivered as the
government’s vaccination programme
brought hope that the pandemic was now
under control, the Labour leader finally called
on Britons to embrace ‘a future that looks
utterly unlike the past’, one devoid of the
inequality and insecurity which marked
the previous decade, and which had left the
country unprepared for Covid and ill-
equipped to address its economic legacy.20
This was a moment for decisive change, he
argued, with Labour looking forward and
aiming to build on the solidarity generated
by the crisis, while the Conservatives only
looked backwards. Starmer claimed this his-
toric moment—which he compared to that of
1945—required an active government willing
to work with the trade unions and socially
responsible businesses to build a more equal
and, therefore, a more dynamic economy.
Starmer presented his case as sensible and
moral: inequality he said was not only wrong
in itself but also economically inefficient.
Given that he wanted to make a general argu-
ment for Labour’s case, one that would
19O. Jones, ‘On tax as on so much else, Keir Star-
mer’s team is fighting yesterday’s battles’, The
Guardian, 26 February 2021; https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/26/keir-
starmer-tax-pandemic (accessed 1 March 2021).
20‘Full text of Keir Starmer speech on A New
Chapter for Britain’, Labour Party, 18 February
2021; https://labour.org.uk/press/full-text-of-
keir-starmer-speech-on-a-new-chapter-for-britain/
(accessed 20 February 2021).
L O O K I N G F O R S T A RM E R I S M 7
© 2021 The Author. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political
Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC).
The Political Quarterly
transcend any post-Brexit culture war, it was a
speech inevitably short on precise policies. But
Starmer did suggest that a government led by
him would ‘ensure people don’t have to leave
their home-town to have a chance of getting a
good job’, which suggested significantly new
levels of planning. If that implied a new policy
designed to appeal to lost foundation seat
voters, Starmer also guaranteed a Labour gov-
ernment would stop students graduating from
university with ‘crippling debt’, reiterating
Corbyn’s promise to abolish tuition fees, an
important factor in Labour’s 2017 appeal to
liberal identifiers.
Together with Shadow Chancellor Anneli-
ese Dodds’ Mais Lecture, delivered just a few
weeks before, the speech set out the key ele-
ments of a developing Starmerism.21 For
Dodds echoed Starmer’s case that the eco-
nomic consequences of Covid required a clean
break with the policies of the past, stretching
back to the dawn of Thatcherism. She con-
firmed Labour would transform the economy
to make it more resilient and competitive
through transparent and ‘responsible’ long-
term decision making that would guarantee
value for money. All this was of course
designed to reassure the City and that majority
of voters who have habitually doubted
Labour’s ability to manage the economy. But
the framework Dodds sketched out also
included, ‘a rebalancing of power in the work-
place, such that employees have a more con-
crete set of rights and a greater sense of
control’ and reverse the damaging impact
of low pay, precarious work and, conse-
quently, of inequality on the economy. She
did not mention the investment banks and
employee ownership schemes advanced in
Labour’s 2019 manifesto, but still outlined an
agenda that would have made most Blairites
blanch.22
While seeking the Labour leadership
Starmer positioned himself between Blair and
Corbyn, but refused to say to whom he was
closest. It is now clear Starmer is—despite
accusations of being a Blairite Trojan horse
and his embrace of patriotism—much closer
in policy terms to his immediate predecessor,
a point Eunice Goes also makes in this special
issue. But Starmer is even closer to the leader
who preceded Corbyn: Ed Miliband. His
attempt to ‘move on from New Labour’ after
2010 by having a more positive attitude to the
state floundered in the face of opposition from
his own MPs. He was also rejected by the
voters in 2015, many of whom still blamed
the supposed overspending of the previous
Labour government for austerity and saw
Miliband as ‘anti-business’. Yet, in the very
different circumstances of the 2017 election,
Corbyn had presented amanifesto to the coun-
try characterised by Stephen Bush as ‘turbo-
charged Milbandism’ and did much better in
the polls, forcing even some parliamentary
critics to see merit in his platform.23 If such
analogies are at all helpful, and from what
we can currently tell, it is likely that, regarding
domestic social and economic policy at least,
Starmerism will prove to be Corbynism with
the brakes on.
Themeans throughwhich Starmer proposes
to deliver his agenda will, however, undoubt-
edly see a move back to a more traditional
pre-Corbynite Labourism. It will be defined
by a relatively uncritical attitude to the British
state, one indicated by his support for the so-
called ‘Spycops Bill’which allows undercover
agents to commit crimes while infiltrating
criminal gangs. Labour also now has a ‘non-
negotiable’ support for Britain’s nuclear deter-
rent and for NATO, matters Corbyn had put
under a question mark. Similarly, the parlia-
mentary Labour Party is back in charge: there
will be no further moves towards givingmem-
bers a greater role in selecting candidates.
And, if only to ensure Labour does not fall foul
of the need to address the EHRC’s recommen-
dations to rid it of the taint of anti-semitism,
party management has now returned to its
21‘Anneliese Dodds—Mais lecture to the Business
School at City University London’, Labour Party,
13 January 2021; https://labour.org.uk/press/
anneliese-dodds-mais-lecture-to-the-business-school-
at-city-university-london/ (accessed 1 March 2021).
22D. Corry, ‘What can we learn from the first major
statement of Labour’s economic policy under Keir
Starmer?’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 92,
no. 1, 2021, pp 113–18.
23S. Bush, ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s policies aren’t that dif-
ferent from Ed Miliband’s or even New Labour.
So why is he being attacked?’, New Statesman,
11 April 2017; https://www.newstatesman.com/
politics/welfare/2017/04/jeremy-corbyns-policies-
arent-different-ed-milibands-or-even-new-labour-so
(accessed 4 March 2021).
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pre-Corbynite pattern (see also Eric Shaw in
this issue).
Conclusion
Starmerism is currently defined by a radical
economic and social agenda, with equality at
its heart, one that bears the marks of the Mili-
band and Corbyn leaderships, albeit framed
by relatively conservative cultural tropes.
How it develops in the midst of economic cir-
cumstances, the likes of which few have expe-
rienced before, is hard to predict. But how far
Boris Johnson returns to ‘business as usual’
once the pandemic has been contained and
whether his government pursues ameaningful
‘levelling up’ agenda that benefits former red
wall constituencies will inevitably leave their
mark—as will matters in the Labour party
itself. Corbyn’s position as a party member
who is nonetheless suspended from the parlia-
mentary Labour Party cannot be sustained.
With 70 per cent of members endorsing those
comments that led to his suspension, much
still hangs on his final fate.24 And as the next
general election comes closer, Starmer will be
obliged to announce specific policies to clarify
the broad direction he has already set out, and
so, plenty of conference votes to be negotiated.
How a divided electorate responds to these
policies will also further shape Starmerism.
After making up much ground during 2020,
since the start of the government’s vaccination
programme Labour’s position in the polls has
become more precarious. We will have to see
how long identity liberals will allow Starmer
to focus on the concerns of their conservative
counterparts: there are likely to be plenty of
by-elections to give both groups a chance to
make their views known.
Faced by one of the most rascally of politi-
cians to occupy Number Ten, Starmer’s
success—never likely given the 2019 result—
is hardly guaranteed. Certainly, in comparison
with Johnson, the consummate campaigner,
he is ill-at-ease on the stump. Given the impor-
tance of a leader’s persona to their party’s abil-
ity to cut through to disengaged voters and to
give a face and a voice to their ‘ism’, Starmer’s
reluctance to talk about himself and his work-
ing class family background is an impediment.
How the son of a nurse and tool maker rose to
become Director of Public Prosecutions could
be used to illustrate any number of helpful
themes. Instead, there is virtual silence, lead-
ing some to see ‘Sir Keir’ as an aloof and patri-
cian figure. And anybody listening to radio
phone-ins will hear the Labour leader regu-
larly described as boring, although in less
polite terms. Many voters are, as a result, still
not sure what it is for which Starmer stands
and they remain to be convinced that Covid
has changed things as much as the Labour
leader contends. If the media are not as hostile
as they were when Corbyn was leader, they
are unlikely to do Starmer many favours. Yet,
as one of the Labour leader’s colleagues from
his time as a QC recalled, ‘I’ve never seen
him make a rabble-rousing speech, I don’t
think that would be in his nature’.25 Even so,
to help Starmerism gain popular traction—to
make it live in voters’minds—Starmer himself
desperately needs the memorable phrases and
sassy delivery that defined Wilsonism at
its peak.
Keir Starmer has now been Labour leader
for over a year: if he was Margaret Thatcher,
this would be 1976. How many spoke of
Thatcherism then? Had Jim Callaghan called
an election in the autumn of 1978, or not pro-
voked the winter of discontent, she might
never have become Prime Minister. And once
in Number Ten, Thatcher was fortunate to face
a split Labour Party, a miscalculating Argen-
tinian dictator and a strategically ineptminers’
leader. Starmer could do with some of
that luck.
Steven Fielding is Professor of Political History
at the University of Nottingham.
24J. Wallis Simons, ‘EXCLUSIVE: 70% of Labour
members still think the party has no problem with
Jew hate and don’t want Corbyn expelled’, Jewish
Chronicle, 30 March 2021; https://www.thejc.com/
news/uk/true-views-of-labour-membership-revealed-
in-new-poll-1.513656 (accessed 9 April 2020).
25Quoted in Hinsliff, ‘Keir Starmer: who is he,
really?’.
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